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Abstract. This work studies deterministic and non-deterministic nonlinear approxima-
tions for cryptanalysis of block ciphers and cryptographic permutations and embeds
it into the well-understood framework of linear cryptanalysis. For a deterministic
(i.e., with correlation ±1) nonlinear approximation we show that in many cases, such
a nonlinear approximation implies the existence of a highly-biased linear approxima-
tion. For non-deterministic nonlinear approximations, by transforming the cipher
under consideration by conjugating each keyed instance with a fixed permutation, we
are able to transfer many methods from linear cryptanalysis to the nonlinear case.
Using this framework we in particular show that there exist ciphers for which some
transformed versions are significantly weaker with regard to linear cryptanalysis than
their original counterparts.
Keywords: Block cipher · Nonlinear invariant · Invariant subspace attack · Nonlinear
approximations · Linear cryptanalysis · Midori
1 Introduction
Block ciphers are certainly among the most important cryptographic primitives when
measured in terms of actual usage in practice. Luckily, ever since the development of the
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) we have at our disposal an efficient block cipher that
withstood a significant amount of cryptanalytic efforts. Indeed, at least in the single-user
scenario, breaking even the smallest variant of AES with a 128-bit key is still completely
out of reach.
However, as the security of any block cipher is always inherently the security against
known attacks, it is still an important task to investigate new ways of trying to tackle the
security of those ciphers. Two current trends in symmetric cryptography stimulate this
development of new attacks and the gain of fundamental new insights.
Firstly, within the last 10 years we have witnessed the emerging of many new ciphers
aiming for execution under extreme performance constraints, often summarized as so-called
lightweight cryptography. Besides the obvious contribution, one major impact of those new
designs was that suddenly many new and interesting targets for new cryptanalytic attacks
were available. Indeed, due to the sharp performance constraints, designs in the area of
lightweight cryptography tend to be minimized with respect to their security margin and
to be maximized with respect to simplicity. This has actually led to many designs being
broken. While in some cases the new designs could be broken with (slightly modified)
standard attacks, we have also seen new attack ideas being developed and some old attacks,
that have been partially forgotten, have found new applications.
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A second, and more recent, trend in symmetric cryptography that can be identified
is the focus on so-called cryptographic permutations as very versatile tools. Instead of a
block cipher, that is a family of permutations, it turns out that in many cases it is enough
to design only one permutation and use it within a suitable mode of operation. Important
examples include Keccak (and more generally the Sponge construction) and many recent
authenticated encryption designs, see e.g. the CAESAR competition. An even more recent
interesting example is the Farfalle construction [BDH+17].
Even though a cryptographic permutation and a block cipher are conceptually very
different objects, it is worth noticing that the design and analysis of both primitives is
very related in practice. Indeed, many cryptographic permutations are analyzed with
respect to differential and linear cryptanalysis just as block ciphers are. While the design
of cryptographic permutations gives significantly more freedom to the designer (especially
in modes where the inverse is not required), for the cryptanalytic scope of our work,
cryptographic permutations can be seen as block ciphers with a fixed key.
When it comes to new attack vectors, a line of work we like to highlight here is the
class of invariant attacks. In a nutshell, those attacks make use of a partition of the
plaintexts into two sets such that, for some keys, this partitioning is invariant under
encryption. Keys for which this partitioning is invariant are called weak keys. The attack
started with the case where the partitioning of the plaintext space was with respect to an
affine subspace and its complement [LAAZ11] and was later generalized to sets of different
form (see [TLS16]). An important detail to point out here is that the partitioning was
found using the iterative structure of virtually all modern block ciphers and cryptographic
permutations. Instead of finding the partition for the whole cipher or permutation directly,
all known attacks of this type find an invariant for a single round, or at most two rounds
as in the recent work [Bey18], and extend those for the whole cipher by induction.
Those two important restrictions, namely a partition that is invariant, i.e., works with
probability one and that the partitioning is invariant for all rounds actually implies that
those attacks, if existent, can be efficiently detected. Even more, under some constraints,
one can even exclude their existence efficiently. As we will discuss below, invariant subspace
attacks and nonlinear invariant attacks can be seen as special cases of attacks that have
been known for much longer. However, those attacks had the significant drawback of being
either too general or of having not enough suitable targets, i.e. block ciphers, at the time
of invention.
However, while those restrictions mentioned above were key to those attacks being
applicable, they immediately lead to many questions to be answered. In particular, directly
related to the two restrictions above, one could investigate how to allow those invariants
to hold with a non trivial probability only, i.e. non-linear approximations. Answering
this question clearly has the ability to give insights significantly improving upon the state
of the art. In particular, this line of research can be expected to shed more light on the
design of cryptographic permutations and the round constants for those.
The task here is to keep the generalization manageable and, in the optimal case, to
link it to well-understood areas of symmetric cryptography.
Our Contribution
This work explores a link between linear cryptanalysis and nonlinear approximations.
In this line, we address the open question mentioned above. Namely, for the case of
partitions that hold with a non-trivial probability only, we establish several links to the
well-understood framework of linear cryptanalysis. This allows us to apply some of the
well-established theory for linear cryptanalysis to its nonlinear counterpart. In Section 2,
we first recall the well-known cryptanalytic approach of approximating a Boolean function
in the cipher’s output by a Boolean function in the input, a method to which both linear
cryptanalysis and invariant attacks belong as special cases. We recall how those two kinds
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of attacks can be phrased in this unified framework.
In Section 3, we then first focus on invariant attacks, i.e., the invariant subspace attack
and the nonlinear invariant attack, which utilize deterministic (nonlinear) approximations
over keyed instances of the cipher for a particular set of weak keys. In this context,
deterministic means that the approximation holds with an absolute correlation equal to 1.
We show that a Boolean function g : Fn2 → F2 which is an invariant for a keyed instance of
the cipher gives rise to the existence of a highly-biased (non-trivial) linear approximation
of the instance in many practical cases. In particular, such linear approximations can be
guaranteed whenever g is either a balanced plateaued function, i.e., a balanced function for
which there exists an L such that its Walsh spectrum is equal to {0,±L}, or an indicator
function of an affine subspace of Fn2 . As plateaued functions contain all Boolean functions of
algebraic degree 2 as a subset, such highly-biased linear approximations can be guaranteed
for the block ciphers Midori64 [BBI+15], SCREAM [GLS+15] and iSCREAM [GLS+14] when
instantiated with a key from the set of weak keys according the nonlinear invariant attack,
as described in [TLS16]. When g is the indicator function of an affine subspace U +a ⊆ Fn2
which is invariant for a keyed instance Ek of the cipher, we show that, for all output masks
γ′ ∈ U⊥ \ {0}, there exists a non-zero input mask γ for which | corEk(γ, γ′)| ≥ 2−n+dimU .
This improves a result derived in [LAAZ11], where the existence of (only a single) linear
approximation with correlation greater or equal to 2−n+dimU − 22(−n+dimU) was shown.
Similar as in [LAAZ11], our arguments are non-constructive and therefore, we are not able
to identify those highly-biased linear approximations. Thus, we just state their existence.
Although those approximations are key dependent, for any weak key, the existence of a
linear approximation with a high bias might still contradict the designers’ claims.
Section 4 deals with utilizing probabilistic nonlinear approximations for block cipher
cryptanalysis. In particular, we propose a way to study nonlinear approximations in the
better-understood framework of linear cryptanalysis. The basic idea is to embed the
balanced nonlinear Boolean function g used for the approximation into one component
function of a bijection G on n bits, where n denotes the block length of the cipher under
consideration. The basic observation is that if the approximation g(x) ≈ g(Ek(x)) holds
with a high bias, the transformed cipher G ◦Ek ◦ G−1 could be approximated by the linear
approximation 〈α, x〉 ≈ 〈α,G◦Ek ◦G−1(x)〉 holding with the same bias, where α determines
the component of G that embeds g, i.e., 〈α,G〉 = g.
As a case study, we consider the lightweight block cipher Midori64 [BBI+15]. We first
express the nonlinear invariant attack in terms of a linear trail over a transformed version
of the cipher. The nonlinear invariant attack could be viewed in terms of an invariant
subspace of dimension (n− 1) over the transformed cipher. We then focus on probabilistic
approximations and show an example on four rounds of Midori64 with independent round
keys. In particular, we show the existence of a four-round linear trail over the transformed
cipher with absolute correlation 2−12.3 for 2208 out of the 2256 possible keys. An important
observation is that the absolute correlation of this four-round trail exceeds the highest
possible absolute correlation of any four-round linear trail for the cipher which is upper-
bounded by 2−16. This implies that considering such a transformed version of the cipher
may reveal unexpected vulnerabilities to linear cryptanalysis. We also exhibit another
linear trail for the transformed version of Midori64 and we show that this trail cannot
be used to estimate the correlation of the corresponding approximation due to a strong
linear-hull effect.
Related Work
In 1993, Matsui introduced the technique of linear cryptanalysis [Mat94b]. The idea can
be phrased as approximating a linear Boolean function in the cipher’s output by a linear
Boolean function in the input. Later in 1995 and 1996, the generalization of utilizing
nonlinear approximations was discussed by Harpes, Kramer and Massey [HKM95] and
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Knudsen and Robshaw [KR96]. The problems that come along with this generalization,
i.e., the much larger search space compared to linear functions and a rather complex key
dependency were already mentioned. Due to the work of Nyberg [Nyb95a] and Daemen,
Govaerts and Vandewalle [DGV95] as well as Daemen and Rijmen [DR07] for the case of
key-alternating ciphers, the technique of linear cryptanalysis and in particular the key
dependency in linear approximations is quite well understood.
Attacks that are based on partitioning the message space in a way that the partition is
preserved after encryption were already considered in the 90s’ by Harpes and Massey [Har96,
HM97] and Paterson [Pat99]. In [Har96, HM97], partitioning cryptanalysis was introduced
as a generalization of Matsui’s linear cryptanalysis. The attack exploits the weakness
that there exists a large subset X of the input space and partitions P = {P1, . . . , P`} and
Q = {Q1, . . . , Q`} of X such that each block of P is mapped to a block of Q under the
encryption. In the special case of linear cryptanalysis, both partitions P and Q consist of a
subset of a hyperplane and a subset of its complement. In [Pat99], the focus was on the case
where the subset X is equal to the whole input space and the previous described property
on preserving a partition holds for each round of an iterated cipher. Thus, the concept
described in [Pat99] is closely related to the invariant subspace attack [LAAZ11, LMR15]
and the nonlinear invariant attack [TLS16]. In [LAAZ11] it was shown that the lightweight
cipher PRINTcipher exhibits the following weakness: There exists an affine subspace (U +a)
of the input space Fn2 such that, for many keys k, the affine space (U + a) is invariant
under the encryption with the key k. This attack has then been successfully applied
to quite a number of recent designs including Midori64 [GJN+16], iSCREAM [LMR15],
NORX v2.0 [CFG+17], Simpira v1 [Røn16] and Haraka v.0 [Jea16]. Moreover, some general
design criteria on the S-box layer have been presented in [GJN+16] in order to prevent the
existence of such invariant subspaces. In [TLS16], similar attacks in the weak key setting
were constructed with the difference that, instead of an affine subspace, the partition of Fn2
into a set I and its complement is preserved under encryption with a weak key. Both of
these attacks exploit the invariance for each round of the cipher separately. In [BCLR17],
the authors show how one could protect lightweight substitution-permutation ciphers
against such attacks by carefully choosing the round constants together with the linear
layer.
Very recently, Beyne defined invariants in terms of eigenvectors of correlation matri-
ces [Bey18]. For Midori64 with modified round constants, he derived an invariant (which
admits a larger space of weak keys) which is not invariant for a single round, but two
rounds instead. Moreover, he found a linear invariant for any even number of rounds for
the modified version of Midori64, which corresponds to a linear approximation of maximum
correlation ±1.
2 Preliminaries
Let n, κ > 1 be positive integers. In this work, we consider a general block cipher
E : Fn2 × Fκ2 → Fn2
(x, k) 7→ E(x, k) .
By the definition of a block cipher, for each k ∈ Fκ2 , the projection Ek := E(·, k) is a
permutation on Fn2 . We will refer to n as the block length, κ as the key length, k ∈ Fκ2 as
the key, and Ek as the keyed instance of the cipher for the key k.
For two arbitrary vectors α, x ∈ Fn2 , we denote the canonical inner product by 〈α, x〉 :=∑
i αixi ∈ F2.
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2.1 Approximations by Boolean Functions
In this work, we consider adversaries who aim at distinguishing a block cipher E from a
family of permutations chosen uniformly at random. We consider the attack strategy of
approximating a (non-constant) Boolean function of the output by a Boolean function of
the input. In a nutshell, given two n-bit non-constant Boolean functions g and h with the
same Hamming weight such that, for many keys k, the identity g(x) = h(Ek(x)) holds with
a high absolute bias, i.e., for significantly more or significantly less than half of all x ∈ Fn2 ,
one obtains a distinguisher by evaluating g and h on (many) known plaintext/ciphertext
pairs (x, y), respectively. For a fixed keyed instance, the bias of such an approximation
can be measured by its correlation, defined as follows.1
Definition 1 (Correlation of an Approximation). Let F : Fm2 → Fn2 be a vectorial function
from m bits to n bits. For any Boolean functions g : Fm2 → F2 and h : Fn2 → F2, the
correlation of the approximation g(x) ≈ h(F (x)) is defined as
corF (g, h) = 2−m
∑
x∈Fm2
(−1)g(x)+h(F (x)) ∈ [−1, 1] .
This general definition of the correlation of a (possibly nonlinear) approximation
captures the notion of a (nonlinear) invariant for a cipher [TLS16]. Indeed, an invariant
for an n-bit permutation F is defined as a set of inputs I ⊂ Fn2 which remains invariant
under F (or which is mapped to its complement Fn2 \ I). This equivalently means that the
indicator function of I, i.e., the n-variable Boolean function g defined by g(x) = 1 if and
only if x ∈ I, satisfies
∀x ∈ Fn2 : g(F (x)) = g(x) + ε
for a fixed ε ∈ F2. In other words, a set I is an invariant for F if and only if its indicator
function g satisfies
| corF (g, g)| = 1 .
2.2 Linear Cryptanalysis
Another special case of the above attack strategy is linear cryptanalysis [Mat94a, Mat94b],
which restricts the choice of the Boolean functions g and h to linear functions. For a fixed
n, the set of linear Boolean functions on n bits, denoted by Ln, forms an F2-vector space
of dimension n. In particular, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the elements
in Ln and the elements in Fn2 as
Ln := {`α : x 7→ 〈α, x〉 | α ∈ Fn2} .
Whenever α 6= 0, the corresponding linear function `α is balanced.
Therefore, in the framework of linear cryptanalysis, we consider an adversary who
selects two elements α, β ∈ Fn2 \ {0} (also called masks) and exploits the approximation
〈α, x〉 ≈ 〈β,Ek(x)〉, which should hold with a high absolute correlation. For the sake of
simplicity, the correlation of a linear approximation will often be denoted by replacing the
involved linear functions by the corresponding masks: For F : Fm2 → Fn2 ,
corF (α, β) := corF (`α, `β), with α ∈ Fm2 , β ∈ Fn2 .
Most notably, when n = 1, i.e., when F is a Boolean function, we define
corF (α) := corF (α, 1) .
1We would like to remark that the cryptographic relevance of the correlation value depends on the
weights of g and h. If they are extremely unbalanced, the advantage of the corresponding distinguisher
might be negligible. A similar situation occurs for extremely unbalanced nonlinear invariants.
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It is worth noticing that the mapping (α, β) 7→ corF (α, β) is the discrete Fourier trans-
form, aka Walsh transform) of F (see e.g. [Nyb95b, Page 113]). Therefore, the set
{corF (α, β), α ∈ Fm2 , β ∈ Fn2} is known as the Walsh spectrum of F .
Computing the correlation over an n-bit function in general quickly becomes impractical
as n increases. However, common ciphers are designed as round-iterated functions and we
can make use of the notion of linear trails, defined as follows.
Definition 2 (Linear Trail (see [DGV95])). Let F : Fn2 → Fn2 be an iterated function of
the form F = Ft ◦ · · · ◦ F2 ◦ F1 with Fi : Fn2 → Fn2 . Given (t+ 1) vectors α0, . . . , αt ∈ Fn2 ,
the tuple (α0, . . . , αt) is said to be a linear trail over F and its correlation is defined as
corF1,...,Ft(α0, α1, . . . , αt) :=
t∏
i=1
corFi(αi−1, αi) .
This leads to the following important theorem for iterative functions, which was first
stated in [DGV95].
Theorem 1 (Theorem of Linear Trail Composition). Let F : Fn2 → Fn2 be an iterated
function of the form F = Ft ◦ · · · ◦ F2 ◦ F1 with Fi : Fn2 → Fn2 . Then, the correlation of
the linear approximation (α0, αt) over F is given by the sum of the correlations of all its
constituent linear trails, i.e.,
corF (α0, αt) =
∑
α1,...,αt−1∈Fn2
corF1,...,Ft(α0, α1, . . . , αt−1, αt) .
For the building blocks of key-alternating ciphers we can easily compute the correlation
of linear approximations according to the following, well-known, rules.
Theorem 2 (Correlation over the Building Blocks of Iterated Ciphers). We can express
the correlation over a linear layer, a key addition, and an S-box layer as follows:
• Let L : Fn2 → Fn2 be a linear permutation. Then,
corL(α, β) =
{
1 if α = L>(β)
0 otherwise
,
where L> denotes the transpose of L.
• Let Tk : Fn2 → Fn2 , x 7→ x+ k be the F2-addition of the round-key k ∈ Fn2 . Then,
corTk(α, β) =
{
(−1)〈α,k〉 if α = β
0 otherwise
.
• Let S : (Fb2)s → (Fb2)s be the s-time parallel application of a function S : Fb2 → Fb2.
Then,
corS(α, β) =
s−1∏
i=0
corS(αi, βi) .
In the following, we consider E to be a key-alternating cipher which iterates the
unkeyed round permutation R : Fn2 → Fn2 for t times and applies the round-key addition
Tki in-between:
E(k0,...,kt) = Tkt ◦ R ◦ Tkt−1 ◦ · · · ◦ Tk1 ◦ R ◦ Tk0 .
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From the above facts, the correlation over a keyed instance for a fixed master key k =
(k0, . . . , kt) can be computed as
corEk(α, β) =
∑
γ1,...,γt−1∈Fn2
(−1)〈γ,k〉
t−1∏
i=0
corR(γi, γi+1) , (1)
where γ0 = α, γt = β and γ = (γ0, . . . , γt) is the linear trail defined by all the intermediate
masks γi.
This equation is what is usually described as the linear hull. One can see that the
absolute value of the correlation of each linear trail is independent of the actual key
k. However, the correlation of the linear hull, i.e. the sum of the correlations of the
constituent linear trails, depends on the key. As computing this sum is usually impractical,
distinguishers (and security arguments) are often based on a single (or few) dominant
linear trail(s). When there is no dominant trail, estimating the correlation is much harder
and often based on heuristic arguments. However, nonlinear invariants and nonlinear
approximations may provide a tool for capturing a linear-hull effect. This was already
nicely illustrated by the linear approximation with correlation ±1 recently exhibited by
Beyne on a variant of Midori64 [Bey18, Section 5.3].
3 A Link between Invariants and Linear Approximations
In this section, we show that the existence of a (nonlinear) invariant in many practical cases,
or the existence of an invariant subspace, is closely related to the existence of highly-biased
linear approximations of the cipher. Besides invariant subspaces, our argument covers
all balanced plateaued invariants, i.e., any balanced invariant for which there exists an L
such that its Walsh spectrum is equal to {0,±L}. In particular, this covers any quadratic
invariant as a special case. Our result is based on the following theorem. Note that parts
of the results presented in this section already appeared in the PhD thesis [Bei18].
Theorem 3 (Nonlinear Trail Composition). Let F : Fn2 → Fn2 and let g, h be n-bit Boolean
functions. Then,
corF (g, h) =
∑
γ,γ′∈Fn2
corg(γ) corF (γ, γ′) corh(γ′) .
Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof of the theorem of linear trail composition.
We first show that, for any γ′ ∈ Fn2 ,
∑
γ∈Fn2 corg(γ) corF (γ, γ
′) = corF (g, `γ′). Indeed,
∑
γ∈Fn2
corg(γ) corF (γ, γ′) =
∑
γ∈Fn2
1
2n
1
2n
∑
x∈Fn2
(−1)〈γ,x〉+g(x)
∑
x′∈Fn2
(−1)〈γ,x′〉+〈γ′,F (x′)〉
= 12n
1
2n
∑
x∈Fn2
∑
x′∈Fn2
(−1)g(x)+〈γ′,F (x′)〉
∑
γ∈Fn2
(−1)〈γ,x+x′〉
= 12n
∑
x∈Fn2
(−1)g(x)+〈γ′,F (x)〉 = corF (g, `γ′) .
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Using the previous formula, we prove the result as follows:∑
γ∈Fn2
∑
γ′∈Fn2
corg(γ) corF (γ, γ′) corh(γ′)
=
∑
γ′∈Fn2
corh(γ′)
∑
γ∈Fn2
corg(γ) corF (γ, γ′)
=
∑
γ′∈Fn2
corh(γ′) corF (g, `γ′)
= 12n
1
2n
∑
x∈Fn2
∑
x′∈Fn2
(−1)g(x′)+h(x)
∑
γ′∈Fn2
(−1)〈γ′,x+F (x′)〉
= 12n
∑
x′∈Fn2
(−1)g(x′)+h(F (x′)) = corF (g, h) .
3.1 Invariant Attacks and a Link to Linear Cryptanalysis
In invariant attacks, the adversary is interested in finding an n-bit non-constant Boolean
function g : Fn2 → F2 for which there exist many keys k such that ∀x : g(x) = g(Ek(x))+εk
for some εk ∈ F2. Those keys are called weak keys for E. In other words, an invariant g
defines a nonlinear approximation with absolute correlation one, i.e., | corEk(g, g)| = 1.
We can now make use of the above theorem about nonlinear approximations and obtain
the following direct corollary.
Corollary 1. Let F : Fn2 → Fn2 and g : Fn2 → F2. Then, g is an invariant for F if and
only if ∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
γ,γ′∈Γg
corg(γ) corF (γ, γ′) corg(γ′)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = 1 ,
where Γg = {γ ∈ Fn2 | corg(γ) 6= 0}.
3.1.1 The Nonlinear Invariants in Midori64, SCREAM and iSCREAM
As examples, we consider the nonlinear invariant attacks on Midori64 [BBI+15], SCREAM
[GLS+15] and iSCREAM [GLS+14], as presented in [TLS16]. In all three examples, the
invariant Boolean function g consists of 16 parallel applications of a function q of degree 2
with corq(α) ∈ {0,± 12} for all α. It follows that the absolute value of corg(γ) is the same
for all γ in Γg and equal to 2−16. Thus, the above formula simplifies to∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
γ,γ′∈Γg
(−1)f(γ)+f(γ′) corEk(γ, γ′)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = 232 , (2)
where f is an n-bit Boolean function, Ek is a keyed instance of the particular cipher with
a weak key, and |Γg| = 232. From Equation (2), we can deduce that, for each weak key,
there must exist linear approximations (over the whole cipher, and in fact for all possible
number of rounds) with absolute correlation at least 2−32.
This observation can be generalized to all balanced plateaued invariants, i.e., to all
balanced functions g such that, for all γ ∈ Fn2 , corg(γ) ∈ {0,±L} for some L (see [ZZ99]).
Plateaued functions include as a special case all Boolean functions of degree 2. Indeed,
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it is well known (see e.g. Theorem 4 in [Car07]) that any n-variable Boolean function
g of degree 2 satisfies corg(γ) ∈ {0,±2
dim LS(g)−n
2 }, where LS(g) := {a ∈ Fn2 : x 7→
g(x+ a) + g(x) is constant}.
We then derive the following theorem which holds in particular when g has degree 2.
Theorem 4. Let g : Fn2 → F2 be a balanced plateaued function which is invariant for Ek.
Then, there exists a function f : Fn2 → F2 such that∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
γ,γ′∈Γg
(−1)f(γ)+f(γ′) corEk(γ, γ′)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = |Γg| .
Most notably, there exist γ, γ′ ∈ Fn2 \ {0} such that
| corEk(γ, γ′)| ≥
1
|Γg| .
Proof. From Corollary 1, we obtain that∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
γ,γ′∈Γg
corg(γ) corg(γ′) corEk(γ, γ′)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = 1 ,
where Γg = {γ ∈ Fn2 | corg(γ) 6= 0}. Since there exists an L such that corg(γ) = ±L for all
γ ∈ Γg, we derive that ∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
γ,γ′∈Γg
(−1)f(γ)+f(γ′) corEk(γ, γ′)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = L−2
for an appropriate function f that takes care of the sign. Moreover, Parseval’s relation
implies that ∑
γ∈Γg
corg(γ)2 = |Γg|L2 = 1 ,
leading to |Γg| = L−2. We deduce that∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
γ,γ′∈Γg
(−1)f(γ)+f(γ′) corEk(γ, γ′)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = |Γg| .
The existence of a pair (γ, γ′) ∈ Γg × Γg such that
| corEk(γ, γ′)| ≥
1
|Γg|
directly follows. The fact that γ and γ′ differ from zero is guaranteed by the fact that g is
balanced, i.e., 0 6∈ Γg.
3.1.2 Examples
In Midori64, the block size is n = 64 and, if we denote the bits in the j-th cell of the state
by xj,3, xj,2, xj,1, xj,0 (where the lsb corresponds to xj,0), the nonlinear invariant is given
by
g(x) =
15∑
j=0
(xj,3xj,2 + xj,2 + xj,1 + xj,0) .
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Equation (2) holds with Γg = {(γ0, . . . , γ15) | ∀j : γj,0 = γj,1 = 1} and
f(γ) =
15∑
j=0
γj,3γj,2 + γj,3 .
In SCREAM, the block size is n = 128 and the nonlinear invariant is given by
g(x) =
15∑
j=0
(xj,2xj,1 + xj,5 + xj,2 + xj,0) .
Equation (2) holds with
Γg = {(γ0, . . . , γ15) | ∀j : γj,0 = γj,5 = 1, γj,3 = γj,4 = γj,6 = γj,7 = 0}
and
f(γ) =
15∑
j=0
γj,2γj,1 + γj,2 .
In iSCREAM, the block size is n = 128 and the nonlinear invariant is given by
g(x) =
15∑
j=0
(xj,5xj,4 + xj,6 + xj,0) .
Equation (2) holds with
Γg = {(γ0, . . . , γ15) | ∀j : γj,0 = γj,6 = 1, γj,1 = γj,2 = γj,3 = γj,7 = 0}
and
f(γ) =
15∑
j=0
γj,5γj,4 .
3.2 The Case of Invariant Subspaces
The case of invariant subspaces is not directly covered by Theorem 4 since the corresponding
indicator function g is not balanced (unless the subspace has dimension (n−1) which would
mean that the cipher has a linear approximation holding with probability 1). However, we
can prove a similar result: The existence of an invariant subspace implies the existence of
a linear approximation of the cipher with a high bias. The result is even stronger than in
the previous case since many such linear approximations can be exhibited.
Theorem 5. Let (U + a) ⊆ Fn2 be an affine subspace of Fn2 invariant under Ek. Then, for
any nonzero γ′ ∈ U⊥, there exists a γ ∈ U⊥ \ {0} such that
corEk(γ, γ′) ≥ 2−n+dimU ,
where U⊥ denotes the orthogonal of U .
Proof. We first prove the following well-known result (e.g., [CC03, Prop. 1]) for the sake
of clarity: For any γ′ ∈ U⊥, we have∑
γ∈U⊥
(−1)〈γ,a〉 corEk(γ, γ′) = 2−n
∑
γ∈U⊥
(−1)〈γ,a〉
∑
x∈Fn2
(−1)〈γ′,Ek(x)〉+〈γ,x〉
= 2−n
∑
x∈Fn2
(−1)〈γ′,Ek(x)〉
 ∑
γ∈U⊥
(−1)〈γ,a+x〉

= 2− dimU
∑
x∈U+a
(−1)〈γ′,Ek(x)〉 ,
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where the last equality comes from the fact that, for any linear space V ,
∑
x∈V
(−1)〈α,x〉 =
{
2dimV if α ∈ V ⊥
0 otherwise
that we apply here to V = U⊥. Now, if (U + a) is invariant under Ek, then Ek(x) belongs
to (U + a) for all x ∈ (U + a). This implies that 〈γ′, Ek(x)〉 = 〈γ′, a〉 because γ′ ∈ U⊥.
We then deduce that ∑
x∈U+a
(−1)〈γ′,Ek(x)〉 = (−1)〈γ′,a〉2dimU ,
or equivalently ∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
γ∈U⊥
(−1)〈γ,a〉 corEk(γ, γ′)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = 1 . (3)
It follows that, for any nonzero γ′ ∈ U⊥, there exists a γ such that
| corEk(γ, γ′)| ≥ 2−n+dimU .
Obviously, this γ differs from 0 since corEk(0, γ′) = 0 if γ′ 6= 0.
Already in [LAAZ11], the authors deduced the existence of a highly-biased linear
approximation from an invariant subspace. In particular, they showed the existence of a
linear approximation with an absolute correlation greater than or equal to
2−n+dimU − 22(−n+dimU) .
Thus, our result slightly improves this bound and further shows the existence of such a
linear approximation for all possible output masks in U⊥.
4 Probabilistic Nonlinear Approximations for Cryptanalysis
In this section, we explain how nonlinear invariants, and more generally probabilistic
nonlinear approximations, can be studied in the framework of linear cryptanalysis.
4.1 Transforming Nonlinear Invariants into Linear Trails
Since linear approximations seem to be much easier to handle, we use the following
trick which enables us to transform a balanced nonlinear invariant g into an invariant
hyperplane. When g is balanced, one can embed g into a bijection G : Fn2 → Fn2 for which
g(x) = 〈α,G(x)〉 for some α ∈ Fn2 , i.e., g can be considered as one component function
of G. The fact that g is an invariant for Ek when k is weak means that there exists an
εk ∈ F2 such that
∀x : 〈α,G(x)〉 = 〈α,G(Ek(x))〉+ εk .
Since G is a bijection, this holds if and only if
∀x : 〈α, x〉 = 〈α,G(Ek(G−1(x))〉+ εk .
Thus, one can understand the invariant attack as having a transformed cipher EG,G
−1
k :=
G ◦Ek ◦ G−1 for which EG,G
−1
k has a linear approximation with absolute correlation 1, i.e.,∣∣∣cor
EG,G
−1
k
(α, α)
∣∣∣ = 1 .
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In other words, replacing Ek by the transformed cipher EG,G
−1
k boils down to replacing
the invariant set I := {x ∈ Fn2 : g(x) = 1} ⊂ Fn2 , of size 2n−1, by the affine hyperplane
H := {y ∈ Fn2 : 〈α, y〉 = 1}. Indeed, for any y ∈ G(I), there exists an x ∈ Fn2 such that
〈α, y〉 = 〈α,G(x)〉 = g(x) = 1 .
This implies that G(I) = H. It follows that G ◦ Ek ◦ G−1(H) = H, i.e., H is an invariant
subspace for the transformed cipher EG,G
−1
k .
So far, we have considered the invariant attack as a linear approximation α→ α over a
transformed cipher EG,G
−1
k that holds with absolute correlation 1. In a more general setting,
the adversary can try to find a transformation EG,G
−1
k and masks α, β ∈ Fn2 such that,
for each weak key k, the approximation α→β holds with a high absolute correlation, not
necessarily equal to 1. This leads to the utilization of probabilistic nonlinear approximations.
If E(k0,...,kt) is a round-iterated cipher where Rki denotes the keyed round using the
round key ki, we have
EG,G
−1
(k0,...,kt) = G ◦ Rkt ◦ Rkt−1 ◦ · · · ◦ Rk0 ◦ G−1 = R
G,G−1
kt
◦ RG,G−1kt−1 ◦ · · · ◦ R
G,G−1
k0
.
Using Theorem 1, the correlation of the approximation α
EG,G
−1
k→ β can be expressed as
cor
EG,G
−1
(k0,...,kt)
(α, β) =
∑
γ1,...,γt−1∈Fn2
t−1∏
i=0
corRG,G−1
ki
(γi, γi+1) , (4)
where γ0 = α, γt = β and γ = (γ0, . . . , γt). Here, γ is similar to what is called a linear trail
in Equation (1). The difference is that the γi are the intermediate masks shifted by the
transformation G. We therefore call γ a G-shifted linear trail through Ek. Its correlation
is defined as
∏t−1
i=0 corRG,G−1
ki
(γi, γi+1).
Moreover, it is important to note that from Theorem 1, the correlation of the trans-
formed cipher is given by
cor
EG,G
−1
k
(α, β) =
∑
γ1,γ2∈Fn2
corG−1(α, γ1) corEk(γ1, γ2) corG(γ2, β)
=
∑
γ1,γ2∈Fn2
corGα(γ1) corEk(γ1, γ2) corGβ (γ2)
where Gα (resp. Gβ) denotes the component function of G: x 7→ 〈α,G(x)〉 (resp. x 7→
〈β,G(x)〉). Obviously, the correlation of the approximation
α
EG,G
−1
k→ β
depends on these two components of G only. However, the correlation of a G-shifted linear
trail through Ek may depend on the other components of G. This dependence then cancels
out when summing the correlations of all trails corresponding to a given approximation.
For the sake of simplicity, we here concentrate on the case where the same transformation
G is used all along the trail. However, a similar analysis holds by using the decomposition
EG,G
−1
(k0,...,kt) = G ◦ Rkt ◦ Rkt−1 ◦ · · · ◦ Rk0 ◦ G−1 = R
G,G−1t
kt
◦ RGt,G
−1
t−1
kt−1 ◦ · · · ◦ R
G1,G−1
k0
,
for any choice of the permutations G1, . . . ,Gt. Again, the correlation of the approximation
α
EG,G
−1
k→ β
does not depend on the choice of the intermediate permutations G1, . . . ,Gt, but the
correlation of each individual trail does.
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4.2 The Nonlinear Invariant Attack on Midori64
We first describe the nonlinear invariant attack on Midori64 given in [TLS16] in terms
of a G-shifted linear trail (see Figure 1). The attack uses the 4-bit Boolean function
g(x) = x3x2 + x2 + x1 + x0 which is invariant for a single S-box S. Without loss of
generality, let G be a bijection on 4 bits that embeds g as its first coordinate function, i.e.,
g(x) = 〈8, G(x)〉 = G8. Then, G := (G,G, . . . , G) is defined as the parallel application of
16 copies of G.
The round function of Midori64 can be described as Rk =M◦P ◦Sk, where Sk applies
the round key addition with k followed by a 16-times parallel application of the 4-bit S-box
S, P applies a word-wise permutation of the 4-bit words of the state (PermuteCells layer),
andM denotes the MixColumns operation. We view the transformed round function as
RG,G−1k =MG,G
−1 ◦ PG,G−1 ◦ SG,G−1k .
The Key Addition and the S-box Layer
Since g is invariant for the S-box S and since g is linear in x0, x1, also g is invariant
for Sk when k ∈ WK := {(0, 0, y1, y0) | y0, y1 ∈ F2}. In our setting, this implies that
| cor
SG,G
−1
k
(8, 8)| = 1 for k ∈WK. Moreover, for all other keys, the correlation is equal to
0.
For the whole S-box layer S = (S, S, . . . , S) and for general input and output masks
αi, βi ∈ F42, with 0 ≤ i < 16, we have
∣∣∣corSG,G−1
k
((α0, . . . , α15), (β0, . . . , β15))
∣∣∣ = 15∏
j=0
∣∣∣∣corSG,G−1
kj
(αj , βj)
∣∣∣∣ .
In our case, it leads to
∣∣∣corSG,G−1
k
((8, 8, . . . , 8), (8, 8, . . . , 8))
∣∣∣ = 15∏
j=0
∣∣∣∣corSG,G−1
kj
(8, 8)
∣∣∣∣
which is equal to 1 if all kj ∈WK and 0 for all other keys k. Therefore, the set of weak
round keys for the whole state is WK := WK16.
The PermuteCells and MixColumns Layer
The PermuteCells layer P just permutes the nibbles of the state according to the Midori64
cell permutation pi. Since each G operates independently on each of the cells, we have that
PG,G−1 = P. Thus,
corPG,G−1 ((α0, . . . , α15), (β0, . . . , β15)) =
{
1 if ∀i : αi = βpi(i)
0 otherwise
. (5)
Since in our case, αi = βi = 8 for all i, the linear approximation trivially holds with
correlation 1.
The MixColumns layer M multiplies each column of the state by the 4 × 4 binary
matrix
M =

0 1 1 1
1 0 1 1
1 1 0 1
1 1 1 0
 .
Christof Beierle, Anne Canteaut and Gregor Leander 93
SG,G−1k
| cor | = 1
for k ∈ WK
PG,G−1 = P
cor = 1
MG,G−1
| cor | = 1
SG,G−1k
| cor | = 1
for k ∈ WK
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Figure 1: The G-shifted linear trail for one round of Midori64 corresponding to the invariant
attack. G = (G,G, . . . , G) is any permutation for which 〈8, G(x)〉 is equal to the invariant
g(x) = x3x2 + x2 + x1 + x0 for the S-box. In this trail, all S-boxes are active.
Let G := (G,G,G,G). Now, the correlation can be computed as
| corMG,G−1 ((α0, . . . , α15), (β0, . . . , β15)) |
=
3∏
j=0
| corMG,G−1 ((α4j , α4j+1, α4j+2, α4j+3), (β4j , β4j+1, β4j+2, β4j+3)) | .
Since G8 is a quadratic function and since M is a binary orthogonal matrix, from Theorem
1 in [TLS16], it follows that
| corMG,G−1 ((8, 8, 8, 8), (8, 8, 8, 8)) | = 1 .
This can also easily be verified by looking at the correlation matrix of MG,G−1 .
All in all, this leads to a G-shifted linear trail through an arbitrary number of rounds
RG,G−1ki of Midori64 that holds with absolute correlation equal to 1 if and only if all round
keys ki are in the set of weak keys WK. In this trail, all S-boxes are active, i.e., all S-boxes
get the non-zero input mask 8 (see Figure 1). It is important to note that, since the
absolute correlation of this G-shifted linear trail is equal to 1, the linear hull as given in
Equation (4) contains no other G-shifted linear trails that have a non-zero correlation.
The property of all round keys being in WK is fulfilled for a fraction of 2−64 of all the
possible initial keys.
4.3 A Probabilistic Nonlinear Approximation for Four Rounds of Mi-
dori64
We give an example of a probabilistic nonlinear approximation on four rounds of Midori64
with independent round keys. This means we omit the key schedule and allow arbitrary
keys in each round. Thus, for four rounds, there are 2256 possible keys. The idea is to find
a permutation G′ and to construct a G′-shifted linear trail – similar to the one depicted in
Figure 1 – that holds with a high (enough) absolute correlation. Note that – by design of
Midori64 – the absolute correlation of any four-round linear trail can be upper bounded
by 2−16 as there are at least 16 active S-boxes in four rounds and the maximum absolute
correlation over the S-box is 2−1. In comparison, the absolute correlation of our four-round
G′-shifted linear trail (as depicted in Figure 2) is only 2−12.325. The number of weak keys
is 2208 out of all 2256 possible keys.
The G-shifted trail corresponding to the nonlinear invariant attack has all S-boxes
active. Here, we reduce the number of active S-boxes in order to allow a larger space of
weak keys.
The Permutation G′
The bijection G′ we are using is the 16-time parallel application of the 4-bit permutation
G′ for which 〈8, G′(x)〉 = g′(x) = x3x2x1 + x3x1 + x3 + x2 + x1 + x0.
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SG′,G′−1k0
| cor | = 1
for k0 ∈ WK′0
PG′,G′−1
cor = 1
MG′,G′−1
cor =
(
11
32
)3
SG′,G′−1k1
| cor | = 1
for k1 ∈ WK′1
PG′,G′−1
cor = 1
MG′,G′−1
cor =
(
11
32
)1
SG′,G′−1k2
| cor | = 1
for k2 ∈ WK′2
PG′,G′−1
cor = 1
MG′,G′−1
cor =
(
11
32
)1
SG′,G′−1k3
| cor | = 1
for k3 ∈ WK′3
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(
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)3
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Figure 2: A probabilistic G′-shifted linear trail for four rounds of Midori64.
Correlation over SG′,G′−1k
The permutation G′ has the property that the absolute correlation of 8→ 8 over SG′,G′−1k
is equal to 1 for k ∈WK′ := {(0, 0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0, 1)}.
Correlation over PG′,G′−1
Again, we have that PG′,G′−1 = P and Equation (5) holds.
Correlation over MG′,G′−1
Let G′ := (G′, G′, G′, G′). Now, by computing the LAT of MG′,G′−1 , one obtains
| corMG′,G′−1 (α,Mα) | =
11
32
if α 6= (0, 0, 0, 0) and all αi ∈ {0, 8}. If the column is not active, i.e., if α = (0, 0, 0, 0), the
correlation is equal to 1.
Putting All Together
One can construct a four-round G′-shifted linear trail that holds with an absolute correlation
of 2−12.325 if all the round keys are weak (See Figure 2). Weak keys are those that are
(0, 0, 0, 0) or (0, 0, 0, 1) in all active cells. The subkey in each of the inactive cells can be
arbitrary.
It is worth remarking that the correlation of this G′-shifted linear trail is independent
of all component functions of G′ except G′8. However, opposed to the G-shifted linear trail
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given in Section 4.2, its absolute correlation is not equal to 1 and thus, the linear hull may
contain other valid G′-shifted linear trails. Which trails exactly and their corresponding
correlations depend on the other components of G′. As an illustration, we computed
the number of constituent G′-shifted linear trails for the approximation corresponding to
the first two rounds of the trail depicted in Figure 2. We used the following two 4-bit
permutations G′1 and G′2 which both satisfy 〈8, G′i(x)〉 = g′(x):
G′1=[0, 8, c, 4, a, 2, 6, e, 9, 1, d, 5, 3, b, f, 7]
G′2=[0, 9, a, 1, 8, 2, 3, f, c, 4, d, 5, 6, e, b, 7]
It can be observed that, with the exception of x 7→ 〈8, G′1(x)〉, the coordinates of G′1
are linear, while the coordinates of G′2 have degree 3. More precisely, 〈1, G′1(x)〉 = x3,
〈2, G′1(x)〉 = x2, 〈4, G′1(x)〉 = x1, and,
〈1, G′2(x)〉 = x0x2x3 + x1x2x3 + x0x2 + x0x3 + x1x2 + x1x3 + x0 ,
〈2, G′2(x)〉 = x0x1x3 + x0x2x3 + x0x1 + x0x2 + x1x3 + x2x3 + x1 ,
〈4, G′2(x)〉 = x0x1x2 + x1x2x3 + x3 .
Then, the linear hull of this two-round approximation contains 35, 937 G′1-shifted linear
trails having a nonzero correlation when G′1 is used, and 282, 184 G′2-shifted linear trails
having a nonzero correlation when G′2 is used. Among those trails, the trail depicted in
Figure 2 has the highest absolute correlation, i.e.,
( 11
32
)4 = 0.013963. This value is close
to the correlation of the approximation which equals 0.013062. Indeed, in both cases,
the vast majority of trails have a very low correlation, typically with absolute value less
than 2−16. However, as already explained before, the resulting correlation of the nonlinear
approximation only depends on x 7→ 〈8, G′(x)〉 = g′(x) and is independent of the other
coordinates of the considered permutation G′.
In order to see whether the correlation of our given G′-shifted linear trail can be used
to approximate the correlation of the approximation over a larger number of rounds, we
fixed one of the 2208 weak keys and experimentally computed the correlation. In particular,
for three rounds (the first three rounds of the trail), we get an estimation for the absolute
correlation of roughly 2−7.49 using 228 randomly chosen plaintexts. Note that we expect a
correlation of (11/32)5 = 2−7.703 from the G′-shifted linear trail. For the four-round case,
we get an estimate for the absolute correlation of ≈ 2−12.16 using 232 randomly chosen
plaintexts.
4.4 A Trail for Full-Round Midori64 and a Strong Linear Hull Effect
So far, we were able to express the approximation α→ β over a transformed round RG,G−1ki
as a single trail through the keyed S-box layer and the linear layer, i.e.,
| corRG,G−1
ki
(α, β)| =
∣∣∣∣∣∑
γ
corSG,G−1
ki
(α, γ) corLG,G−1 (γ, β)
∣∣∣∣∣
= | corSG,G−1
ki
(α, α) corLG,G−1 (α, β)| = | corLG,G−1 (α, β)|.
The reason for this is that we have chosen input masks α that propagate through SG,G−1k
to the output mask α with absolute correlation 1. In principle, one can also consider masks
(and keys) such that this propagation is not deterministic (the corresponding shifted trail
will also consider intermediate masks after SG,G−1k ).
We can give an example of such a trail through the full-round version of Midori64 (also
taking care of the actual key schedule!).
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The Permutation G′′
The bijection G′′ is very similar to G above. The only difference is that the 4-bit
sub-permutation G of the upper left cell of the state is replaced by G′. Thus, G′′ =
(G′, G,G, . . . , G).
Correlation over SG′′,G′′−1k
The permutation G′ has the nice property that the correlation of 8→ 8 over SG′,G′−1k is
non-zero for all the keys k ∈ F42. In particular, it is
| cor
SG
′,G′−1
k
(8, 8)| =
{
1 if k ∈ {(0, 0, 0, ∗)}
2−1 if k /∈ {(0, 0, 0, ∗)} .
Since in all other cells of the state, the permutation G is the same as above, it is
| corSG′′,G′′−1
ki
((8, 8, . . . , 8), (8, 8, . . . , 8)) |
= | cor
SG
′,G′−1
ki,0
(8, 8)|
15∏
j=1
| cor
SG,G
−1
ki,j
(8, 8)| ≥ 2−1
if the round key ki ∈ WK′′ := F42 × {(0, 0, ∗, ∗)}15.
Correlation over PG′,G′−1
The PermuteCells layer P does not permute the upper-left cell of the state. Therefore, we
again have PG′′,G′′−1 = P and (8, . . . , 8)→ (8, . . . , 8) holds with correlation 1.
Correlation over MG′′,G′′−1
Let again G := (G,G,G,G) and let further G′′ := (G′, G,G,G). Now, one obtains
| corMG′′ ,G′′−1 ((8, . . . , 8), (8, . . . , 8)) |
= | corMG′′,G′′−1 ((8, 8, 8, 8), (8, 8, 8, 8)) |
3∏
j=1
| corMG,G−1 ((8, 8, 8, 8), (8, 8, 8, 8)) |
= | corMG′′,G′′−1 ((8, 8, 8, 8), (8, 8, 8, 8)) | ≈ 2−0.83
by computing the LAT of MG′′,G′′−1 .
Putting All Together
One finally obtains a shifted trail that holds with absolute correlation ≥ 2−1.83 over a
single round of Midori64 if the round key belongs to the set of weak keys WK′′ (See
Figure 3). Thus, for 16 rounds of Midori64, the absolute correlation can be lower bounded
by 2−16·1.83 = 2−29.28. Based on this single trail, we should have a full-round distinguisher
for Midori64 that works for a fraction of 2−60 of all the initial keys.
A Strong Linear-Hull Effect
It turns out that iterating the G′′-shifted linear trail given in Figure 3 over multiple rounds
does not well approximate the linear hull and therefore, we do not have a full-round
distinguisher as it was expected by the trail.
Christof Beierle, Anne Canteaut and Gregor Leander 97
SG′′,G′′−1k
| cor | ≥ 2−1
for k ∈ WK′′
PG′′,G′′−1 = P
cor = 1
MG′′,G′′−1
| cor | ≈ 2−0.83
SG′′,G′′−1k
| cor | ≥ 2−1
for k ∈ WK′′
8 8 8 8
8 8 8 8
8 8 8 8
8 8 8 8
8 8 8 8
8 8 8 8
8 8 8 8
8 8 8 8
8 8 8 8
8 8 8 8
8 8 8 8
8 8 8 8
8 8 8 8
8 8 8 8
8 8 8 8
8 8 8 8
8 8 8 8
8 8 8 8
8 8 8 8
8 8 8 8
Figure 3: A G′′-shifted linear trail for the Midori64 round that considers the intermediate
masks after SG
′′
,G′′−1
k .
We can observe the linear-hull effect in more detail on a small-scale variant of Midori,
which we define as two rounds operating on a single column. In particular, we consider
the cipher defined by E(k0,k1) = M ◦Sk1 ◦M ◦Sk0 , where S := (S, S, S, S) is the four-time
parallel application of the Midori S-box, M the MixColumns matrix, and k0, k1 ∈ F162 the
two round keys. For all k0, k1 ∈WK′′ := F42 × {(0, 0, ∗, ∗)}3, we computed the correlation
of the approximation (8, 8, 8, 8)→ (8, 8, 8, 8) over EG′′,G′′−1(k0,k1) . Our results are as follows:
We obtain a correlation of exactly 0 if and only if k1 ∈
(
F42 \ {(0, 0, ∗, ∗)}
)× {(0, 0, ∗, ∗)}3.
In all other cases, the absolute correlation can take various values. In particular, if
k0, k1 ∈ {(0, 0, ∗, ∗)}4, the set of possible values for the absolute correlation is
{0.546875, 0.55859375, 0.5703125, 0.625} .
If k0 ∈ F42 \ {(0, 0, ∗, ∗)} × {(0, 0, ∗, ∗)}3 and k1 ∈ {(0, 0, ∗, ∗)}4, the set of possible values
for the absolute correlation is
{0.15234375, 0.1640625, 0.16796875, 0.1796875, 0.19140625,
0.203125, 0.21875, 0.23046875, 0.2421875, 0.25390625} .
As examples, for fixed choices of k1, we give the condition on k0 that lead to the same
value for the absolute correlation of the approximation in Tables 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively.
Table 1: Fixing the second round key k1 = (0, 0, 0, 0), this table shows all possible values
for the absolute correlation of the approximation (8, 8, 8, 8)→ (8, 8, 8, 8) over EG′′,G′′−1(k0,k1)
for k0 from the set of weak keys WK′′.
abs. correlation condition on k0
0.625 k0 ∈ {0, 1} × {0, 1, 2, 3} × {0, 1, 2, 3} × {0, 1, 2, 3}
0.5703125 k0 ∈ {2, 3} × {0, 1, 2, 3} × {0, 1, 2, 3} × {0, 1, 2, 3}
0.2421875 k0 ∈ {4, 5, 8, 9, c, d, e, f} × {0, 1, 2, 3} × {0, 1, 2, 3} × {0, 1, 2, 3}
0.25390625 k0 ∈ {6, 7, a, b} × {0, 1, 2, 3} × {0, 1, 2, 3} × {0, 1, 2, 3}
5 Conclusion
In this work, we have studied a link between nonlinear and linear approximations in
cryptanalysis. In the first part, i.e., Section 3, we have shown that in many practical cases
a nonlinear invariant or an invariant subspace implies the existence of a highly-biased linear
approximation. More precisely, we have improved the bound on the bias given in [LAAZ11]
for the case of invariant subspaces, and we have exhibited a nonlinear counterpart by
proving that the same result holds for many nonlinear invariants.
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Table 2: Fixing the second round key k1 = (0, 0, 0, 1), this table shows all possible values
for the absolute correlation of the approximation (8, 8, 8, 8)→ (8, 8, 8, 8) over EG′′,G′′−1(k0,k1)
for k0 from the set of weak keys WK′′.
abs. correlation condition on k0
0.625 k0 ∈ {0, 1} × {0, 1, 2, 3} × {0, 1, 2, 3} × {0, 1, 2, 3}
0.55859375 k0 ∈ {2, 3} × {0, 1, 2, 3} × {0, 1, 2, 3} × {0, 1, 2, 3}
0.25390625 k0 ∈ {4, 5} × {0, 1, 2, 3} × {0, 1, 2, 3} × {0, 1, 2, 3}
0.2421875 k0 ∈ {6, 7, 8, 9} × {0, 1, 2, 3} × {0, 1, 2, 3} × {0, 1, 2, 3}
0.23046875 k0 ∈ {a, b, c, d} × {0, 1, 2, 3} × {0, 1, 2, 3} × {0, 1, 2, 3}
0.21875 k0 ∈ {e, f} × {0, 1, 2, 3} × {0, 1, 2, 3} × {0, 1, 2, 3}
Table 3: Fixing the second round key k1 = (0, 0, 0, 2), this table shows all possible values
for the absolute correlation of the approximation (8, 8, 8, 8)→ (8, 8, 8, 8) over EG′′,G′′−1(k0,k1)
for k0 from the set of weak keys WK′′.
abs. correlation condition on k0
0.546875 k0 ∈ {0, 1} × {0, 1, 2, 3} × {0, 1, 2, 3} × {0, 1, 2, 3}
0.55859375 k0 ∈ {2, 3} × {0, 1, 2, 3} × {0, 1, 2, 3} × {0, 1, 2, 3}
0.15234375 k0 ∈ {4, 5, 8, 9} × {0, 1, 2, 3} × {0, 1, 2, 3} × {0, 1, 2, 3}
0.1640625 k0 ∈ {6, 7, c, d} × {0, 1, 2, 3} × {0, 1, 2, 3} × {0, 1, 2, 3}
0.19140625 k0 ∈ {a, b} × {0, 1, 2, 3} × {0, 1, 2, 3} × {0, 1, 2, 3}
0.203125 k0 ∈ {e, f} × {0, 1, 2, 3} × {0, 1, 2, 3} × {0, 1, 2, 3}
Table 4: Fixing the second round key k1 = (0, 0, 0, 3), this table shows all possible values
for the absolute correlation of the approximation (8, 8, 8, 8)→ (8, 8, 8, 8) over EG′′,G′′−1(k0,k1)
for k0 from the set of weak keys WK′′.
abs. correlation condition on k0
0.546875 k0 ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} × {0, 1, 2, 3} × {0, 1, 2, 3} × {0, 1, 2, 3}
0.1640625 k0 ∈ {4, 5} × {0, 1, 2, 3} × {0, 1, 2, 3} × {0, 1, 2, 3}
0.15234375 k0 ∈ {6, 7, 8, 9, c, d} × {0, 1, 2, 3} × {0, 1, 2, 3} × {0, 1, 2, 3}
0.16796875 k0 ∈ {a, b} × {0, 1, 2, 3} × {0, 1, 2, 3} × {0, 1, 2, 3}
0.1796875 k0 ∈ {e, f} × {0, 1, 2, 3} × {0, 1, 2, 3} × {0, 1, 2, 3}
In the second part, i.e., Section 4, we have proposed a way to study nonlinear approxi-
mations in the framework of linear cryptanalysis by transforming the original cipher under
consideration and applying linear cryptanalysis to the transformed cipher. We have seen
an example in which an appropriate transformation reveals a weakness with regard to
linear cryptanalysis that was claimed by the designers to be nonexistent based on the
minimum number of active S-boxes.
Open Problems
One open issue raised in Section 3 would be to further characterize the highly-biased linear
approximations that are implied by the invariants. For instance, if g denotes the invariant
under consideration and k denotes a weak key, it would be nice to deduce something
about the distribution of the values for corEk(γ, γ′) over all γ, γ′ ∈ Γg. Actually, this is
depending on the particular choice of k and, for an iterated cipher E, also on the number
Christof Beierle, Anne Canteaut and Gregor Leander 99
of rounds.
A major open problem discussed in Section 4 is to understand the linear-hull effect
with regard to the G-shifted linear trails, and in particular the key dependency within
those linear hulls. What is the particular reason that allows to approximate the correlation
of the linear approximation by the shifted linear trail given in Figure 2 and what exactly
goes wrong when utilizing the G′′-shifted trail given in Figure 3? In this context, a good
start would be to further understand the linear-hull effect on the two-round small-scale
variant of Midori described at the end of Section 4. In particular, the occurrence of the zero
correlation is interesting here. For studying this linear-hull effect, we think that analyzing
the other valid shifted linear trails is not very helpful as those (and their correlations) are
depending on other components of the transformation G. However, one can ask whether
there exist some appropriate choices for the other components of G which make the analysis
easier.
Another interesting question is whether we can use the presented framework on nonlinear
approximations to describe clustering of linear approximations more generally and to
establish to which kind of round functions exactly we can apply the framework.
As we have only given an example in which a transformed version of a cipher has a
weaker resistance against linear cryptanalysis than the original one, future work would be
to spot such kind of weaknesses in more existing ciphers.
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